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ABSTRACT
Ubiquitous anomalies endanger the security of our system con-
stantly. They may bring irreversible damages to the system and
cause leakage of privacy. Thus, it is of vital importance to promptly
detect these anomalies. Traditional supervised methods such as De-
cision Trees and Support Vector Machine (SVM) are used to classify
normality and abnormality. However, in some case the abnormal
status are largely rarer than normal status, which leads to decision
bias of these methods. Generative adversarial network (GAN) has
been proposed to handle the case. With its strong generative abil-
ity, it only needs to learn the distribution of normal status, and
identify the abnormal status through the gap between it and the
learned distribution. Nevertheless, existing GAN-based models are
not suitable to process data with discrete values, leading to immense
degradation of detection performance. To cope with the discrete
features, in this paper, we propose an efficient GAN-based model
with specifically-designed loss function. Experiment results show
that our model outperforms state-of-the-art models on discrete
dataset and remarkably reduce the overhead.
KEYWORDS
GAN, discrete features, Wasserstein distance, multiple intermediate
layers
1 INTRODUCTION
The vicious cyber-intrusions endanger our devices all the time, they
have many severe consequences such as the unauthorized divulge-
ment of information, the tampering, destruction, and expungement
of data. Thus unsupervised and efficacious detection is required to
respond to these malicious intrusions against networks and com-
puters. Lots of explorations have been done with both statistical
learning methods and neural networks[6, 14].
To effectively classify the normal internet connections and intru-
sions. Classical supervised methods such as Decision Trees[3, 16,
17] and SVM[10] are applied to this detection task. However, the
number of anomalous samples are usually largely fewer than that
of normal samples. The obvious imbalance between the amount of
normal and anomalous samples is fatal to these statistical learning
models. Because the imbalance may bring a bias on the judgement
of these supervised models. Besides, when a new kind of appears,
it will be time-costing to manually give the label.
Other unsupervised methods such as Local Outlier Factor[5],
Robust Covariance[15], Isolation Forest[13], etc., can mitigate the
above issues to some degree. They detect the abnormal samples
mainly based on the density of probability. In other words, they
depend on the occurrence frequency of the samples. These methods
have better performance on imbalanced dataset compared with su-
pervised methods. However, misjudgment will ineluctably happen
if a non-emerging normal sample deviates from the centralized
region. As Figure 1 shows, those frequency-based methods need
Figure 1: LOF on anomaly detection. Chromatic points are
different types of normal samples. Black points are judged
anomalous samples. The black points in black circle aremis-
judged normal samples due to their low frequency of occur-
rence and deviation from centralized region.
sufficient capacity to learn the features of normal samples. Unfor-
tunately, in the real world, the data usually has complex feature
distribution, which limits by the feature representation ability of
these frequency-based methods.
In recent years, generative adversarial network(GAN)[9] is preva-
lent for its strong generative ability. In its classical model, a gen-
erator and a discriminator are trained to generate results in an
adversarial way – generator tries to generate samples that can fit
the distribution of real samples, and the discriminator tries to distin-
guish the generated samples (fake samples) from the real samples.
Since GAN is able to learn the distribution of data, it can naturally
be used to learn the distribution of normal data, especially where
anomalies are scarce in the training set. In testing (shown as Figure
2), we can find the most similar sample with the testing sample
from the learned distribution and through the defined anomaly
score based on the intensity of the discrepancy between the testing
samples and the found samples we can know how anomalous the
testing sample is.
The essence of using GAN for anomaly detection is learning the
feature of normal data and accurately find the ’normal version’ of
the testing sample. AnoGAN[20] is proposed to better extract the
feature of normal samples, by establishing a mapping between the
real space and latent space. And through the discrepancy between
themapped sample and testing sample, we can approach the optimal
’normal version’ of testing sample. But this mapping is based on
the back-propagation algorithm, thus when the dimension of data
increases, this model will be time-consuming and not suitable for
timely intrusion detection. To ease the above challenge, a new
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Figure 2: Green point is the tesing sample. Red point is the
most similar sample with the testing sample a generator can
generate, which can also seen as the ’normal version’ of test-
ing sample.
model [21] is adopted, inspired by the structure of BiGAN[7], to
remarkably reduce the time cost.
However, the following problems remains in the anomaly detec-
tion task. In the training data for cyber-intrusion detection, those
discrete features are lethal to traditional GANs, during whose train-
ing process the loss criterion is cross-entropy – a measurement
which is not proper to weigh two distribution without overlapping.
To overcome the above hurdles, in this paper, we proposed a
GAN-based model with refined loss function to obtain an outstand-
ing performance on the imbalanced dataset with discrete features.
Furthermore, we used the multiple intermediate layers to soften the
decision of discriminator to obtain a more moderate result.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: we describe
the related work in Sec 2. Sec 3 expatiates the details of our model.
We show the experiments in Sec 4. The paper is concluded in Sec 5.
2 RELATEDWORK
2.1 Traditional Methods
Copious work had been done in cyber-intrusion detection, as sur-
veyed byAnna L. Buczak and ErhanGuven[6]. Blowers et al. adopted
clustering method like DBSCAN[4] to distinguish the anomalous
intrusion, Khan[11] used Genetic Algorithm to detect intrusion.
In addition, decision trees such as ID3[16] and C4.5[17] algorithm
also be applied to the detection task. Li et al. proposed SVM classi-
fier with RBF kernel to mark off the intrusion. Nevertheless, these
methods all have deficiency respectively, for instance, decision
trees need enough memory to run, so they may improper for a too
big dataset. Furthermore, SVM-involved methods usually need an
optimal hyperplane to divide the normal features and abnormal
features, which implies they are time-consuming approaches to
high-dimension data. Meanwhile, as mentioned before, the scarce
anomalous sample in training also leads to their underperformance.
2.2 GAN-based methods
The initial purpose to apply GAN on anomaly detection task is to
learn the distribution of normal status; then through the discrep-
ancy between the testing sample and learned distribution, we can
judge whether the testing sample is in anomalous status(suffered
from a cyber-intrusion). However, the problem is how to evaluate
the discrepancy after the learning about the distribution of normal
status is completed?
Thomas Schlegl et al.[20] explained since the mapping from
latent space to real space(the task of generator) is well learned, the
result generated by generator should perfectly fit the distribution of
normal status. Hence if the corresponding latent status of a testing
sample is found, then through the generator, the latent status can be
mapped into real space and the regenerated sample, which also can
be seen as a ’normal version’ of the testing sample, should fit the
distribution of normal status. However, the basic structure of GAN
only unilaterally reflects the latent space into real space, inversely
finding the corresponding latent status of the testing sample in real
space is challenging. Based on smooth transition of latent space[18]
that two status close in latent space generates two similar samples
in real space, Thomas Schlegl et al. randomly chose a latent status
z1 in latent space at the beginning, then obtainedG(z1), a real space
sample, through generator. Finally, through the anomaly score(a
derivable loss function) defined between G(z1) and testing sample,
the location of the corresponding latent status of the testing sample
is optimized by an iterative process via back-propagation algorithm.
However, the back-propagation steps are time-consuming and
not suitable for timely cyber-intrusion detection. In later work,
Houssam Zenati et al.[21] adopted BiGAN[7] to simultaneously
learn the mapping from real space to latent space through encoder
when the mapping from latent space to real space was learned by
generator. The advent of encoder remarkably reduces the time cost
in finding the latent status.
As for cyber-intrusion detection task, the two models above
still have deficiency – the discreteness in the features of training
data is fatal to their cross-entropy loss function during the training
process(Sec 3.3), thus causes mode collapse[8]. When that happens,
all input samples will be mapped to similar output samples; and the
optimization fails to make progress [23]. This is a vital deficiency
because when training process is trapped in this situation, we can
simply extract some localized features. What we learned from these
features is just an incomplete distribution (several local onefold
parts from the distribution of normal status). Consequently, an
incomplete distribution can hardly dispose the the diversification
of cyber-intrusion.
To get out of this plight, we refined the loss function during train-
ing process of the two previous models to have a better performance
on cyber-intrusion detection(Sec 3.2) and ameliorated the anomaly
score to effectively extract features in deeper networks(Sec 3.3).
3 OUR MODEL
This section first describes the structure of proposed GAN model;
it then illustrates the training process of the model. The last part is
about the anomaly assessment we designed.
3.1 Proposed GAN Structure
The skeleton of our model is derived from BiGAN[7], which not
only reflects the latent samples into real samples in generator but
also synchronously reflects the real samples into their latent status
through encoder showed in Figure 3. The addition of the encoder is
meaningful because with this mechanism there is no need to find
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Figure 3: Structure of BiGAN. z and E(x) are in latent space,
G(z) and x are in real space. After training process com-
mences, z (initialized latent status) and x (samples from
training set) are converted into G(z) and E(x) respectively,
then the two pairs (G(z), z) and (x, E(x)) will be stuffed into
discriminator, finally the gradient update will be send back
to optimize the generator and the encoder.
the corresponding latent status of a sample anew in later testing
part, which process will cost much time based on back-propagation
method. In BiGAN, when we learning the mapping from latent
space to real space, the inverse mapping from real space to latent
space will simultaneously be learned by encoder. Benefited from
this ingenious structure, we can instantly obtain the correspond-
ing reflection in latent space belongs to a certain testing sample
through the learned mapping. Apart from time-saving, the bilateral
constraint is also conducive to more effective feature extraction
and more unambiguous mapping[7].
3.2 Training procedure
Different strategies had been explored to optimize the training
process of GAN. The most widely used goal is a minimax objective
which illustrated as below:
min
G
max
D
V (D,G) (1)
V (D,G) = Ex∼pX [logD(x)] + Ez∼pZ [log(1 − D(G(z)))] (2)
Where D, G separately represents discriminator and generator, pX
is the distribution of normal samples x , pZ is the distribution over
the latent space.
In the goal above where cross-entropy loss function using loд cri-
terion is a classic tactic. As Jianhua Lin explained in this paper[12],
cross-entropy can be used to measure the Shannon Entropy needed
to eliminate the uncertainty between two distributions, so it should
naturally be the measurement of the disparity between two distri-
butions P and Q:
H (P ∥Q) = Ex∼pX [− logQ(x)] = −
∑
P(x) logQ(x) (3)
In machine learning field, cross-entropy is not the unique approach.
Since during the training process of GAN, P can be seen as a con-
stant variable which represents the distribution of normal sample.
Hence Kullback-Leibler(KL) divergence also can be used to weigh
the diversity of two distributions because:
KL(P ∥Q) = H (P ∥Q) − H (P) (4)
Yet there is a deficiency in KL divergence: KL(P ∥Q) , KL(Q ∥P),
which means the KL divergence is asymmetrical so it can not be
used to represent the distance between two distributions. This a
fatal factor since inconsistent discrepancy brings no benefit to our
training – we do not know whether KL(P ∥Q) or KL(Q ∥P) should
be taken to represent the gap between the two distributions. Thus
Jensen-Shannon(JS) divergence is designed as follows to satisfy the
symmetry required by distance:
JS(P ∥Q) = 12KL(P ∥
P +Q
2 ) +
1
2KL(Q ∥
P +Q
2 ) (5)
Profited from the duality in this principle, JS divergence can be
seen as a sort of distance. Actually, JS divergence is the foundation
most GANs work on and this divergence indeed helps a lot in image
generation, in which field the dimension expansion is not so severe.
Whereas for data with discrete features in cyber-intrusion detection
such as the 0-1 representation of logic gate and non-numeric value
that relies on One-Hot Encoding or Dummy Encoding, its dimension
expansion can be very severe so that there will be few overlapping
between real samples and generated samples. For example, when
a sample from latent space is mapped into real sample space with
higher dimension through Generator, all the varieties in higher
dimension space are actually be constrained by the sample from
lower dimension space. So the dimension of the support of the
higher dimension space is the dimension of the latent space in
fact. Under the sway of dimension expansion, two distributions
will have few overlapping inevitably, but discrete feature will ag-
gravate it because of One-Hot Encoding or Dummy Encoding. And
when two distribution have few overlapping, JS divergence will
unavoidably converge to a constant, then leads to the happening of
vanishing gradient. Fortunately, in previous work, Martin Arjovsky
et al.[1] supplanted the JS divergence with Wasserstein Distance,
which performs well even on the discrete distribution. Inspired by
Wasserstein distance, we modify the training goal of our model as
follows:
min
G,E
max
D
V (D,E,G) (6)
V (D,E,G) = Ex∼pX [Ez∼pE(· |x )∥D(x , z)∥w ]
+ Ez∼pZ [Ex∼pG(· |z)[1 − ∥D(x , z)∥w ]] (7)
Where D, E, G separately represents discriminator, encoder and gen-
erator, pX is the distribution of normal samples x , pZ is the distribu-
tion over the latent space, and pE(z |x), pG(x |z) is the distribution
learned by encoder and generator respectively. w represents the
Wasserstein distance, it also facilitates the discrimination process
compared with cross-entropy measurement and helps to ameliorate
the generation process to generate more stable and more premium
results.
In addition, the network should also be optimized. As is known
to all, the data used to identify an intrusion is not like an image.
In an image, where features around a specific feature usually have
relevance with each other. For example, a pixel can be seen as a
feature in image vector(image will be unrolled as a vector during
training process), suppose there is a pixel in the canopy of a tree
image, then the pixels surrounding it should intuitively outline
the silhouette of the canopy. However, the features of the working
status of a machine are independent features, there rarely exists
3
Figure 4: In testing, when a testing sample x comes in, its corresponding latent distribution E(x) will be found through Encoder
and through Generator the ’normal version’, G(E(x)), of testing sample will be found. Their L1 loss is residual loss. After they
are fed in Discriminator, we can obtain some output from intermediate layers, and the weighed sum of the delta L1 losses is
defined as discrimination loss.
relevance between those features. In this scenario, classical con-
volution kernel exerts poor influence on extracting features, so
we adopt the FC(Full Connection) layer with dropout operation to
construct our networks.
3.3 Anomaly Assessment
As for anomalous intrusion detection task, an evaluation standard
is of necessity. Given there does not exist a unified criterion to
assess the quality of generated result – most applications of GAN
were aimed to image generation so we can distinguish the superior
or inferior through our naked eye, a principle is needed to guide
us how to judge the quality of generated samples not similar with
images. Since the greater the difference between the testing sample
and the learned distribution of normal status, the more likely the
testing sample is anomalous. Thus the discrepancy can be taken into
account to evaluate the samples and there is no need to evaluate the
result generated through generator directly. We have tried several
definitions of anomaly score but they are essentially similar, inspired
by definition proposed by Thomas Schlegl et al.[20], the anomaly
score we designed is as below:
S = (1 −
n∑
i=1
λi )LR +
n∑
i=1
λiLDi (8)
Where λi is a constant and
LR = |x −G(z)| (9)
LDi =
∑
| fi (x , z) − fi (G(z), z)| (10)
S is the anomaly score, LR is called Residual Loss, used to measure
the dissimilarity between testing sample and the regenerated sam-
ple, in this formula, z and x are corresponding point in latent space
and real space respectively, under the postulation that a perfect
generator and a perfect mapping from latent space to real space, we
have LR = 0 because x and G(z) are identical. The second loss LD
is defined as Discrimination Loss, whose function is learning the fea-
ture representing. As emphasized by Goodfellow et al.[19], feature
matching addresses the instability of GANs due to over-training on
the discriminator response, so in the feature matching technique,
the generator is mandated to generate data that has similar statistics
as the training data instead of optimizing the parameters of the
generator by maximizing the output of discriminator on generated
examples(Eq.7).
In Discrimination Loss, f is an intermediate layer embedded in
discriminator, f (·) is the output of this layer, the Σ reveals there
can exist several intermediate layers up to actual situation, and the
closer the intermediate layer to the final logits produced by discrim-
inator, the coefficient should be greater. The multiple intermediate
layers(Figure 4) help to better evaluate the difference between the
pair of discriminator’s input, with the introduce of intermediate
layer, the adaptation of the coordinates of z does not only rely on a
hard decision from the trained discriminator, about whether or not
a generated image G(z) fits the learned distribution of normal data,
but also takes the rich information about the feature representa-
tion into account during the learning process of discriminator. The
L1 loss criterion of intermediate layers is also known as Feature
Matching.1
The last part is the investigation about how to select the anoma-
lous sample according to their anomaly score. We proposed two
criterion
• The first one is more practical in real life. In simple words,
we need to add abundant already-known intrusion samples
into a well-pretrained model to procure their anomaly score.
Empirically, we can find a threshold to determine the in-
trusion, in later detection we can judge a sample whether
anomalous mainly from their anomaly score – less than the
threshold represents normal, and vice versa. This method is
proper to online detection, for there is no need to make sense
1compared with the cross-entropy method in this paper[21]
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Table 1: Performance on KDD-99 dataset
Model Precision Recall F1
Isolation Forest 0.4415 0.3260 0.3750
OC-SVM 0.7457 0.8523 0.7954
DSEBM-r 0.8521 0.6472 0.7328
DSEBM-e 0.8619 0.6446 0.7399
AnoGANFM 0.8786 0.8297 0.8865
BiGANFM 0.6578 0.7253 0.6899
Our Model 0.9324 0.9473 0.9398
of the proportion of normal samples and abnormal samples,
all we need is a threshold obtained from experience.
• The secondmethod is based on the proportion of normal sam-
ples and abnormal samples, this method is usually applied
to the test on dataset and thus to evaluate the performance
of the model. In practice, we need the contaminate rate2 c%
before testing, after the anomaly score of all the samples be
computed, we take the top c% score and label their relative
samples as anomalous intrusions.
4 EXPERIMENT
4.1 Dataset
Our experiment was based on KDD-99 (10 percent), a dataset widely
used for the testing of cyber-intrusion detector. This database con-
tains a standard set of data to be audited, which includes a wide
variety of intrusions simulated in a military network environment.
Each sample in this dataset is a network connection recording and
has 41 features such as connection time, protocol type and a la-
bel noted as ’normal’ or a certain attack name which represents
’abnormal’.
4.2 Data Preprocessing
Note that, in this dataset, the quantity of ’abnormal’ samples far
outnumber the ’normal’ samples, which is incompatible with the
actual situation where the ’normal’ samples usually have the dom-
inant quantity. Thus we follow the setup in this paper[21], label
the ’abnormal’ samples as the ’normal’ and the ’normal’ samples
as the ’abnormal’. This trick will not affect the identification ability
of model because pure intrusion detection is a binary classification
problem(anomalous intrusion or not). Accurately discern the nor-
mal status also means accurately discern the anomalous intrusion.
In addition, for those discrete features whose value is not numeric,
we recommend Dummy Encoding or One-Hot Encoding.
Before the training commences, we randomly dichotomize the
initial dataset(around 500,000 samples) as two sets, then choose
the normal-label samples from one set as the training set to train
our model, subsequently pick the normal-label and abnormal-label
samples from the other set in proportion to contaminate rate as the
testing set.
2the empirical ratio of anomalous samples : anomalous / (normal + anomalous)
Figure 5: Performance of our model on KDD-99 with 20%,
10%, 5%, 1% contaminate rate respectively.
4.3 Results
We reappeared several models including traditional anomaly de-
tection methods such as Isolation Forest, Robust Covariance and
previous GAN-based models for anomaly detection. The result of
the comparison between them and our model is demonstrated in
Table 1.34
Meanwhile, considering different occurrence frequency of cyber-
intrusion, we also have explored the effect that different contami-
nate rate will exert on our model, we decreasingly choose 20%, 10%,
5% and 1% as the contaminate rate, the changes of precision, recall
and F1 score are showed in Figure 5.
4.4 Overhead
As mentioned by Tim Bass[2], even a model can reach 100% accu-
racy in detection, it should consider the detection latency, because
the adversary still have enough time to damage the system if detec-
tion process cost excessive time.
In theory, during the training process, Wasserstein distance,
which is demonstrated as the form of L1 loss, will cost less compu-
tation source than cross-entropy loss function. Meanwhile, during
the testing time, when computing the anomaly score of samples, our
feature matching method in Discrimination loss still performs better
than the cross-entropy method. Given this GAN-based model[21]
has the best performance on anomaly detection presently, we select
it as the benchmark. The comparison of training time is showed
in Figure 6. Besides, Figure 7 demonstrates the overhead of testing
process. Since different configuration of a machine will lead to a
heterogeneous testing result, we separately show the comparison
in Figure 7: (a) is the comparison between AnoGAN and BiGAN,
based on NIVIDA Tesla K40 GPUs, pronounced by Houssam Zenati
et al.[21]. (b) is the comparison between BiGAN[21] and our model
based on Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-5200U CPUs. From Figure 6 and Fig-
ure 7, it can be clearly seen that our model has better performance
on training or testing process compared with previous GAN-based
model.
3Values of OC − SVM , DSEBM and AnoGANFM are from paper[22][20]
4The result of BiGANFM is obtained through the source code provided by the
author[21], all experiments ran on the same conditions, but the precision, recall and
F1 pronounced in their paper was 0.8698, 0.9523 and 0.9058.
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Figure 6: Average Training Time(s) of several experi-
ments ran on Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-5200U CPUs. Bench-
mark is the state-of-the-art GAN-based model on anomaly
detection[21].
(a) NIVIDA Tesla K40 GPUs, Tensorflow
1.1.0 and Python 3.5.3
Model Time(ms)
AnoGANFM 3527
BiGANFM 5.3
Speed Up ∼660
(b) Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-5200U CPUs, Ten-
sorflow 1.1.0 and Python 3.5.3
Model Time(ms)
BiGANFM 1.9
Our Model 1.4
Speed Up ∼1.357
Figure 7: Average testing time over 100 batches
5 CONCLUSION
We demonstrated our GAN-based model can be used for cyber-
intrusion detection task which enable the effective recognition
of anomalies on unknown data based on unsupervised training.
In general, the bilateral transformation structure is conducive to
constructing the mapping between latent space and real space in a
more accurate way, the Wasserstein distance we adopted performs
well on weighing the disparity between two rarely overlapping
distributions and the multiple intermediate layers are advantageous
to appraise the anomaly score of a targeted sample. The model
we designed outperforms previous GAN-based models on cyber-
intrusion detection task. Meanwhile, it remarkably curtails the time
cost on training and testing process.
In future work, we plan to investigate the temporal influence
on cyber-intrusion detection. The occurrence of some intrusions
may be owing to a chronic process, in which situation we can not
discern a delitescent anomaly instantly but must wait for a period
of time. So if the ability to dispose of temporal feature can be inset
in GAN, the model is feasible to solve intrusion detection problems
in a wider range.
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